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Abstract
This essay offers an intermediate discussion of select policy, strategic, operational, and tactical 
issues that demonstrate where and how the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s novel coronavirus 
response on the one hand, and homeland security frameworks and research on the other, 
converge or—more often so—diverge, and how to narrow this gap. Although typically framed 
as a pandemic owned by the public health sector, the COVID-19 response falls directly within the 
homeland security mission space, whose core missions include “Ensuring Resilience to Disasters.” 
In some respects, Pennsylvania’s response exemplifies best practices suggested by research. In 
other dimensions, it is neither in line with what research would recommend nor with what the 
National Preparedness System would mandate. The Keystone State has yet to fully make the step 
from disaster to catastrophe as the characteristic challenge to U.S. emergency management 
in our century. Response to catastrophic crisis cannot be siloed; it requires adaptivity and an 
inclusive approach to the community. 
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As United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has pointed out, the “We Are All in This 
Together” slogan also means that the COVID-19 situation exceeds the quality of a pandemic and 
is a complex catastrophe.1 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has released 
guidance for the management of concurrent emergencies in the evolving COVID-19 context.2 
With its complex distributed political and organizational structure as a Commonwealth, 
Pennsylvania faces many complexities and dilemmas in its response to COVID-19.  This essay 
offers an intermediate discussion of select policy, strategic, operational, and tactical issues that 
demonstrate where and how the Pennsylvania response  converges with and diverges from 
homeland security frameworks and research and how to narrow this gap. Legal action and court 
decisions related to the Pennsylvania state government’s COVID-19 response therefore are 
beyond the focus of this analysis.3 
Although typically framed as a pandemic owned by the public health sector, the COVID-19 
response falls directly within the homeland security mission space, with its core mission no. 5 
being to “Ensure Resilience to Disasters.”4 In fact, 
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On March 19th [2020], FEMA’s role in the pandemic response changed. Under the direction 
of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, FEMA moved from playing a supporting role in 
assisting the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was designated 
as the initial lead federal agency for the COVID-19 pandemic response, to coordinating the 
Whole-of-Government response to the COVID-19 pandemic.5 
Core Characteristics of Pennsylvania’s 
COVID-19 Response
The Commonwealth’s Department of Health  activated its Department Operations Center 
at the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency’s (PEMA) on February 1, 2020 and on 
March 4, 2020, PEMA activated its Commonwealth Response Coordination Center, while 
Governor Tom Wolf issued a “Proclamation of Disaster Emergency” on March 6, 2020.6 Before 
COVID-19 containment action was taken, PEMA, assisted by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Health, organized a pandemic planning event for all state agencies, with a workshop and 
tabletop exercise to jointly address states of preparedness, potential impacts, and continuity 
of operations planning.7 After that planning event, there was very little  evidence of an all-of-
government approach coming from the Governor’s office.  
Governor Tom Wolf’s operational response began on March 12 in Montgomery County, which  
had seen an uptick in cases, with school closures and the request for non-essential businesses 
to close and residents to limit travel. Early on, the Governor also successfully requested funds 
from the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program to offset some of the economic impacts 
of his evolving COVID-19 containment actions on small businesses. 
As the situation evolved, the Governor used what he referred to as a “data-driven” county-
per-county approach to lockdown (stay-at-home orders) and reopening, based on infection 
trends and additional metrics such as contract tracing capability.8 The first counties were shut 
on March 23, and Governor Wolf ordered a state-wide shut-down on April 1. The “Process to 
Reopen Pennsylvania” then started on May 8.9 The phased approach to reopening was based 
on metrics including but not limited to the infection-rate trend. It uses a traffic light-like color 
scheme, where red means the stay-at-home and non-life sustaining business closure order 
remains in effect, yellow means lifting of the stay-at-home order and certain business closures 
for “aggressive mitigation,” and green signifies further lifting of restrictions with national 
guidelines from the Centers of Disease Control (CDC) and state guidelines from the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health to be closely followed and enforced at state and local level.10
According to the Governor’s Office, “decisions and actions were taken on a state, county, and 
regional basis in coordination with local elected officials, public health experts, and other 
stakeholders.”11 However, on the weekend of May 9-10, there was a showdown between Governor 
Wolf and several counties of the Commonwealth that unilaterally announced their intention to 
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defy the governor’s extended COVID-19 stay-at-home order and to decide themselves when they 
were going to open.12 At the same time, several local law-enforcement agencies declared they 
would not continue to enforce certain business closure orders, and some local leaders said they 
would not let township police enforce the Governor’s order without their express approval.13 
As several counties went ahead to announce that they would move from the “red” to the “yellow” 
phase based on their own, not the governor’s decision, Governor Wolf issued a remarkably harsh 
response using the federal and state funding stick as well as some martial language. For example, 
in public statements and through news media, he accused certain state senators and county 
commissioners of acting “cowardly” and “choosing to desert in the face of the enemy.”14 Most of 
the counties backed down and one approach taken was to establish a local reopening commission 
that assessed the business impact of extended closures and a possible way forward in line with the 
Governor’s guidance. That approach in turn was met with criticism from African-American leaders, 
who were not initially represented on that commission.15
On May 15, protesters who were members of the ReOpen PA group which at that time comprised 
around 85,000 concerned citizens rallied around the Pennsylvania State Capitol in Harrisburg, PA, 
joined by citizens associated with like-minded groups from across the Commonwealth.16
In early July, while some cities expressed their deep disappointment about not being allowed 
by the Governor to move to the “green” phase, other cities, such as Philadelphia, constructed 
their own “modified green” phase, to complete confusion. As Philadelphia Health Commissioner 
Thomas Farley clarified—although the Governor was sending the city to “green,” Philadelphia 
determined the city did not currently meet all the metrics for that; hence, the hometown 
of Independence Hall announced its own schedule for reopening17 that Governor Wolf 
subsequently endorsed.18 
By mid-July, all counties had formally moved to the “green” phase. This “greening” might have 
sent the wrong signal to some parts of the population and since then, an increase in COVID-19 
cases has been seen. Already on July 1, Health Secretary Rachel Levine had issued an order 
requiring all Pennsylvanians to wear masks whenever they leave home; on July 15, the Governor 
and the Health Secretary additionally issued “Targeted Mitigation” orders, reprimanding the 
irresponsible behavior of some parts of the public and among other things putting occupancy 
limitations on bars and nightclubs as well as requiring teleworking wherever possible.19 
Governor Wolf and Secretary of Health Levine led the Commonwealth’s response, with little 
to no visible involvement of county and local-level emergency management agencies. The 
narrative centered on the “flatten the curve” slogan, with the rationale changing over time 
from a flattened curve buying time to prevent the health sector from being overwhelmed 
with an influx of COVID-19 patients to a flattened curve actually reducing the total number 
of infected people and saving lives. As was  characteristic of the response elsewhere in the 
U.S. (as well at the federal level) the Department of Health quickly assumed ownership of the 
crisis and integrated it from the coordinating agency (in line with Emergency Support Function 
[ESF] 8 according to the National Response Framework)20 to the lead agency. As has been the 
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case in the United States’ COVID-19 response overall, public health sector leadership was 
vociferous early on with its claims and interest in massive protection of its own sector of critical 
infrastructure, preferring a risk elimination approach over the risk management approach that 
characterizes homeland security policy and strategy.21 
To note, at the federal level, “under the direction of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, 
FEMA moved from playing a supporting role in assisting the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), which was designated as the initial lead federal agency for the response, 
to directing it.”22 The federal response uses the model of a “Unified Coordination Group” that is 
made up of the FEMA Administrator, the HHS [Health and Human Services] Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and a CDC [Centers for Disease Control] 
representative—which has responsibility for operational command, leadership, and 
decision-making for the COVID-19 pandemic response. The three leaders are partners 




In the Three Mile Island nuclear accident of 1979, Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh had 
used what he later on characterized as a pluralistic crisis management style of “trusted ad-
hocracy.”24 Within that style, moral authorities in crisis response and crisis communication, such 
as subject-matter expert—but not technocrat—Herold Denton, emerged as the crisis evolved, 
and that came with a lot of inherent legitimacy and capability for subject matter expertise-
based “intelligent social control.”25 Aiming at a more integrated response, which  is  in line 
with the National Response Framework, and using a lead (rather than coordinating) agency 
approach, Governor Wolf instilled a maximum of crisis governance power in his Health Secretary 
Levine— resulting in the creation of  of a sole moral agent who can’t be legitimately criticized 
or otherwise challenged. A Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry at the Penn State College of 
Medicine who previously served as Pennsylvania’s Physician General, Levine symbolizes the 
data-driven and research-informed approach of the state to the COVID-19 response. 
However, as Naomi Zach and the disaster ethics paradigm would posit, the “common good”—
Rousseau’s concept of what brings benefit to all of society—cannot be determined by number 
crunching.26 A public health metrics-focused data-driven approach to COVID-19 is limited 
by two factors.  First, a common shortcoming is that only pandemic data and projections 
seem to be used, with no adequately comprehensive set of indicators applied that would, 
among others, also include business recovery and social life data.27 Second, from a homeland 
security perspective, the public health sector  needs to include cross-agency training and 
communication, community involvement, and be able to build its response efforts on an 
established pre-disaster routine.28
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In bioethics, the tendency of public health sciences and practice to focus on risk avoidance (as 
opposed to risk management, ) has been criticized.29 At the same time, risk personalization is 
integral to effective public warning systems and strategies. However, it becomes difficult when “a 
personal understanding of what was meant by the warning” is difficult for people to form.30 When 
public crisis communication is fixated on infection counts, hospital beds and ventilator numbers, 
as well as sometimes wild extrapolations on case numbers, it makes risk personalization difficult 
and enhances the  ‘it won’t happen here/it won’t happen to me’ effect,31 thus de-incentivizing 
public compliance with behavioral mandates  such as mask wearing. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the Governor and the Health Secretary needed to add several targeted mitigation orders on 
top of each other in an effort to tackle compliance issues. 
Preparedness Gap
If the COVID-19 response is research-based, it should not be overwhelmed by the unexpected, 
as the Pennsylvania response was,  by the the “Reopen Pennsylvania” campaign .32 The 
situation Pennsylvania found itself in  was  not  beyond imagination, and neither has it been 
beyond expectation. As noted by Peter Hough, “as with famines and hunger, however, major 
epidemics and pandemics (international epidemics) of diseases represent only dramatic 
periodic escalations of an underlying and persistent threat.”33 According to the National 
Biodefense Strategy of 2018, under its Goal 1, “the United States will build risk awareness at the 
strategic level, through analyses and research efforts to characterize deliberate, accidental, and 
natural biological risks”—the related objective being to “ensure decision-making is informed 
by intelligence, forecasting, and risk assessment.”34 In fact, pandemic planning models and 
scenarios have covered COVID-19-like and worse pandemics for almost as long as the homeland 
security enterprise has existed. 
According to the Centers of Disease Control (CDC), at the time of the finalization of this article 
(September 24, 2020), there have been 6,916,292 total cases of COVID-19 and 201,411 deaths 
attributed to COVID-19 in the U.S., of which 2 percent of the cases (153,397) and 4 percent of 
the death toll (8,079) have fallen upon Pennsylvania.35 Worldwide, according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), there were 31,664,104 cases and 972,221 deaths as of September 24, 2020.36 
In the National Planning Scenarios of 2005, “Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak—Pandemic 
Influenza”37 portrays a hypothetical public health emergency with 85,000 fatalities in the U.S. 
(which the COVID-19 pandemic has far exceeded), and 300,000 hospitalizations, which is in the 
dimension of the cumulative number of COVID-19-related hospitalizations nation-wide which  
had surpassed 300,000 on July 29, 2020, reaching 400,840 by September 24.38 As a result, based 
on the scenario assumptions, the load on the health sector has been within the forecast range 
and hence should not have been unanticipated. 
As well, the challenge of concurrent public health and public policy crises (such as the George 
Floyd protests and civil unrest39) has been as anticipated in scenario foresight. In the Rockefeller 
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Foundation’s “Lock Step” scenario developed in 2010, a new influenza virus kills 8 million people 
worldwide (COVID-19 so far having killed close to 1 million) and some governments’ overbroad 
response starts to threaten civil liberties and democratic values, evoking mass protest.40 
As another example: The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC),  
conducted a pandemic influenza preparedness study. Its planning model estimation was that a 
catastrophic pandemic would overwhelm the nation’s healthcare capabilities in seven to ten weeks, 
with the healthcare sector going out of capacity and having to reject 3 to 4 million patients.41
Moreover, state-of-the-art reviews had identified health policy as an emerging “key element of 
building resilience.”42 At the textbook level, “catastrophic pandemic” scenarios including related 
ethical decision-making challenges have been covered as well.43 We have been teaching our 
students for quite some time the catastrophic character of a potential crisis like the  COVID-19 
pandemic , and now we find out that  due to the systemic risks of our “‘just-in-time delivery’ 
economy, the United States has insufficient surge capacity for health care, some food supplies, 
and many other products and services.”44
Crisis Communication
Governor Wolf’s and Secretary Levine’s  crisis communication style has been straightforward, 
which comes with its advantages and disadvantages. When public compliance challenges are 
anticipated, clamorous crisis communication can increase peoples’ following of behavioral 
mandates because it interrupts normal routine and instills a sound sense of emergency where 
environmental clues are absent,45 such as with a virus that cannot be seen  On the other 
hand, following the “homeland security vision,”46 crisis management policy and politics should 
themselves bear resemblance to the principles of the American Way of Life and the massive 
democratic experiment it relies on. This however has not always been the case in Pennsylvania’s 
COVID-19 response. 
The governor’s questionable personification of the novel coronavirus as an “enemy” that 
Pennsylvanians must courageously stand together to defeat,  however is an expression of long-
standing U.S. national security culture. As such, it may even be seen as an effective communicative 
crisis management strategy because as James Sperling argues, “Americans require a palpable 
existential threat to conduct a purposeful security policy; there appear to be no permanent 
interests independent of the threat posed by a malevolent ‘other’.”47 However, because of that, 
in political and public discourse, homeland security policies can easily be militarized.48 Defense 
support of civil authorities and homeland defense being essential, the broader public still tends to 
confuse homeland security as a civil security and law-enforcement based enterprise, centered on 
a whole-community approach, with national defense and its kinetic approach. This misconception 
also is  present in Pennsylvanians’ minds.49 Therefore, using martial metaphors to solicit a unified 
county and community response may be penny-wise but pound-foolish if one looks at the 
COVID-19 response as an aspect of the homeland security mission set. 
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It was also predictable that in the COVID-19 crisis, the Governor’s Office and the Department 
of Health’s response would be confronted by some state lawmakers, local government, 
and members of the public because as Richard Sylves asserts, “emergency management 
is conducted in an American political culture. Therefore it is often challenged by people’s 
fundamental distrust of government planning efforts”.50 Moreover, it is neither unusual nor 
egregious but normal for crisis management to involve “politics of crisis management” as 
crises put “public leadership under pressure” and public crisis management is not a secretive 
expert responsibility but an open governance challenge.51 Yet Pennsylvania’s public health 
administration’s reaction to such challenges has been confrontational and seemingly partisan 
at times. Not shy about making political statements, as a state administrator, Health Secretary 
Levine has been seen by her critics as lacking the democratic legitimacy to do so.52 The following 
press release of June 22, 2020 is indicative of the problem. 
Against the advice of public health experts and against orders from Gov. Wolf and 
Sec. of Health Dr. Rachel Levine aimed at keeping Pennsylvanians healthy, Lebanon 
County commissioners voted 2 to 1 along party lines to prematurely reopen in late 
May. Now, the county is facing an uptick in cases, and is unable to move to green.
Lebanon County’s partisan, politically driven decision to ignore public health experts 
and reopen prematurely is having severe consequences for the health and safety of 
county residents,” Dr. Levine said. “Case counts have escalated and the county is not yet 
ready to be reopened. Lebanon County has hindered its progress by reopening too early. 
Because of this irresponsible decision, Lebanon County residents are at greater risk of 
contracting COVID-19.53
Otherwise worthy of criticism, a strength of this communication is that it emphasizes the ‘It ain’t 
over till it’s over’ principle, criticizing premature political action of crisis termination.54 However, 
the adversarial communication style represented by this statement is an example of public 
health technocracy confronting public policy choices. In Pennsylvania, county commissioners 
are elected politicians and the Health Secretary is an appointed public servant. As Sylves 
points out, “[t]he ethos of U.S. emergency management” includes an “emphasis on grassroots 
local emergency management in emergencies and disasters with overhead governments 
providing help but not taking command or control of local emergency response and recovery 
operations.”55 As Pitirim A. Sorokin concluded in Man and Society and Calamity (1942), 
calamities come with a “general increase of governmental control” and a corresponding need to 
emphasize constitutional rights and liberties as well as to practice democratic institutionalism in 
the public administration of the catastrophe.56
Pennsylvania’s reopening plan was  divided into a red, a yellow, and a green phase. Other states, 
for example New York, use a numbered phases system that may be a better model. Homeland 
security studies have found color-coded risk communication systems ineffective, the Homeland 
Security Advisory System (HSAS) being the most prominent example. It was replaced with the 
more detailed National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) as under HSAS too much context 
needed to be provided separately to equip the public with actionable information.57 In fact, 
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Governor Wolf has been busy explaining the details and meaning of the color-coded system on 
his social media outlets. An additional complication stems from the fact that  some jurisdictions 
within the Commonwealth have added their own variant of a more restricted “green phase.” 
This is a good example of disaster research’s long-standing finding that, as semiotics calls it, 
indexical signs are not enough to  transmit behavioral instructions effectively.58 
CONCLUSION
As Mike Bourne argues, “[h]omeland security first and foremost seeks to secure not just survival 
but ways of life.”59 While ensuring resilience to catastrophic disaster is a core homeland security 
mission, seldom in the era of modern democracy have so few restricted so many so much as in 
the COVID-19 response. Also, with problematic gubernatorial communication , those affected 
can easily be deprived of fair voice opportunity and crisis communication can have too much of 
a top-down orientation. 
First of all, a global lesson learned from COVID-19 so far also applies to Pennsylvania, as Mami 
Mizutori points out: 
“Risk has become systemic. It cannot be divided into categories that are then assigned 
to health authorities, disaster management agencies or early warning centres. If 
governments continue to operate in this way, the bigger picture as a disaster unfolds will 
remain unseen and the solutions will not be fit for purpose.”60 
Pennsylvania has yet to fully make the step from disaster to catastrophe as the characteristic 
challenge to U.S. emergency management in our century.  Response to a catastrophic crisis 
cannot be chopped into separate silos of responsibility, 61 and it must be able and willing to 
reform itself in action, being responsive to and appreciative of the whole community and its  
evolving concerns and needs. 
That said, the Keystone State’s response exemplifies broader national issues. An example 
of those is the switching of preparedness planning to a capability-based approach after the 
Hurricane Katrina experience and the advent of the whole-community principle.62 We now 
know how the capability-based approach can work against the whole-community approach: 
namely, in situations such as the COVID-19 response, where an isolated focus was laid on 
sustaining certain health sector capabilities in the face of worst-case scenarios of numbers of 
infected people requiring hospitalization and intensive care. Such a response of protecting the 
healthcare system at virtually any cost, based on needs assessments derived from statistical 
modeling, is not consistent  with the National Preparedness Goal “in a manner that allows 
our interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.”63 In a public-health context as well,  “all 
security involves trade-offs,”64 and, as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres also 
reminded us, the best approach is one that responds proportionately to immediate threats 
while protecting human rights and the rule of law. More than ever, governments must be 
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transparent, responsive and accountable. Civic space and press freedom are critical. Civil society 
organizations and the private sector have essential roles to play. And in all we do, let’s never 
forget: The threat is the virus, not people.65
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